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Note
Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State: Public
Sponsorship of Religious Displays Under the
Federal and California Constitutions
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court departed radically from
traditional establishment clause1 analysis developed over the past forty
years. In Lynch v. Donnelly,2 the Supreme Court upheld the maintenance
of a creche, or Nativity scene, with public funds, on land owned by a
nonprofit corporation as part of a Christmas display by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island. The Supreme Court rejected any single standard3
for determining the constitutionality of government aid to religion.
Commentators have accused the Court in Lynch of paying mere "lip service" to traditional establishment clause analysis. 4 Prominent constitutionalists reviewing the Lynch decision have been less kind. 5 Professor
Van Alstyne described Lynch as involving "a paradigmatic disregard '6of
the establishment clause in virtually every dimension of its concerns."
In many other fields of constitutional law, the Supreme Court recently has shown a similar growing reluctance to limit government action
threatening individual rights. 7 This trend has caused a number of commentators to suggest a reexamination of state constitutions in order to
1. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the first amendment have a single
aim: the protection of religious liberty. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
concurring).
305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
2. 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984) (plurality opinion).
3. Id. at 1362.
4. Fausto v. Diamond, 589 F. Supp. 451, 465 n.15 (D.R.I. 1984); see also Lynch, 104 S.
Ct. at 1370-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of applying traditional establishment clause analysis in a less than vigorous fashion).
5. See infra note 281 & accompanying text. Professor Kurland accused the Lynch majority of being "disingenuous in reaching a dubious goal for unexpressed reasons . .

.

. The

[Lynch] opinion was sleazy." Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH.
U.L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1984).
6. Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 781.
7. As Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court recently noted: "Few will gainsay
the observation... that the current Supreme Court 'is no longer a bold, innovative institution
and has abandoned, for the moment at least, the role of keeper of the nation's conscience.'"
Mosk, ContemporaryFederalism, 9 PAc. L.J. 711, 714 (1978) (quoting Wilkes, The New Feder-
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provide protection for individual rights.8 A reexamination of state constitutional guarantees against government aid to religion is particularly appropriate in light of the Lynch decision.
Several state courts have noted that the establishment clause of the
first amendment is vague and subject to varying interpretation. 9 In contrast, similar provisions in state constitutions governing state aid to
religion usually are more explicit. Some state constitutions prohibit financial aid to religious societies or to religion in general.' 0 Others prohibit
the donation of property for religious uses I or governmental preference
of certain religions. 12 Finally, some courts prohibit all of these

activities. 13
During the years that immediately followed World War II, federal
courts interpreted the federal establishment clause as providing new protections against state aid to religion.' 4 In many instances, federal proalism in CriminalProcedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 421
(1974)).
8. See, e.g., Mosk, supra note 7. Justice Mosk briefly summarized California Supreme
Court decisions affording broader protection for individual rights than their federal counterparts and urged the "highest courts of a state to evaluate state legislation, state administrative
action, or the conviction of a defendant in a state prosecution, pursuant to the provisions of the
state constitution." Id. at 721 (emphasis in the original). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). Justice Brennan,
observing that the combination of state and federal constitutional guarantees provides double
protection of individual rights, encouraged independent state interpretation of state constitutional guarantees: "With the federal locus of our double protections weakened, our liberties
cannot survive if the states betray the trust the Court has put in them." Id. at 503.
9. See infra note 271 & accompanying text.
10. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; COLO. CONsT. art. IX, § 7;
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5; IND. CONST. art. I,
§ 6; MASS. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16;
MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 66; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 7; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 11; NEV. CONST.
art. XI, § 10; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; VA.
CONST. art. IV, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 15; Wis. CONST.
art. I, § 18; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 19.
11. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7; IDAHO CONsT. art. IX,
§ 5; MASS. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 3;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 16; WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 11.
12. See ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 3; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 24; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 4;
ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 18; Mo. CONST. art.
I, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 3; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3; PA. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6; W. VA. CONsT. art. III, § 15.
13. The constitutions of Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
Texas, and West Virginia prohibit both government appropriations in aid of religion and the
preference of one religion over another. See supra notes 10, 12.
14. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (prohibiting state placement of copies
of the Ten Commandments in public schoolrooms); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
(prohibiting state reimbursement of a portion of the salaries of parochial schoolteachers); Ab-
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tections were applied in the face of state court decisions that encouraged
government participation in religious activities. 15 As a result, state courts
have largely ignored their own constitutions, relying on the broader federal protections instead.1 6 As federal protections narrow, however, the
17
independent mandates of state constitutions can no longer be ignored.
The state courts must not tolerate government aid to religion that violates
these mandates.
California courts have recognized the independent vitality of the California Constitution and have interpreted it to provide unique protections
against government action that threatens individual freedom of conscience. As one commentator observed, "[T]he California Supreme Court
has established itself as the preeminent state forum in the bill of rights
area .... If other state courts are in doubt as to precedent for going
beyond the constitutional minima set by the fourteenth amendment, they
need only look to California's example." 1 8 During the past decade, California courts have relied on the California Constitution to develop comprehensive guarantees against government aid to religion.
This Note examines the growing divergence between federal and California law on government aid to religion, 19 specifically focusing on the
constitutionality of government-sponsored religious displays under the
federal and California Constitutions. It first traces the development of
establishment clause analysis. The Note then describes the United States
Supreme Court's use of establishment clause analysis to validate statesponsored religious displays, focusing on Lynch. It next examines the
permissibility of religious displays under the California Constitution and
demonstrates that California law provides substantial guarantees against
state-sponsored religious displays absent under current interpretations of
the federal establishment clause. Finally, this Note suggests that other
state courts should use California law as a model to reexamine their state
ington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting Bible reading in public
schools).
15. As one commentator observed: "Instead of maintaining a 'wall of separation' [between church and state], many state courts have upheld enactments benefiting religion by narrow technical readings of their state constitutions." Paulsen, State Constitutions,State Courts
and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REv. 620, 642 (1951). For an overview of state
court decisions rendered prior to the development of federal establishment clause doctrine, see
id. at 635-42.
16. In several cases, state constitutional provisions were mentioned, but never analyzed.
Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. App. 3d 885, 139 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1970), vacated, 22 Cal. 3d
792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Paul v. Dade County, 202 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.), cert denied, 207 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968); Eugene
Sand & Gravel v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558 P.2d 338 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876
(1977).
17. See Brennan, supra note 8, at 502.
18. Note, ProjectReport: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 271, 326 (1973).
19. See infra notes 148-85, 208-35, 265-78 & accompanying text.
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constitutions in order to provide greater protections against government
aid to religion.
Federal Establishment Clause Doctrine
Background
The first amendment to the United States Constitution commands
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' 20 While these two clauses have a
single aim-the protection of religious liberty2 1-they accomplish this
purpose through different means. The free exercise clause prohibits direct
governmental interference with private religious expression. 22 In contrast, the establishment clause reflects the Framers' recognition that individual religious liberty also is threatened by government sponsorship of a
23
particular religious viewpoint.
During the century and a half preceding World War II,24 regulation
of state and municipal aid to religion was a matter of strictly local concern. State laws on aid to religion developed independently of federal
guarantees. This changed, however, during the 1940's when the United
States Supreme Court applied the religion clauses to the states. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut,25 the Supreme Court ruled that the free exercise
of religion was a fundamental right of citizenship protected from encroachment by the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 26 Seven years later, the Supreme Court ruled in Everson v.
Board of Education27 that the establishment clause also was applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. 28 The Everson Court held
that the purpose of the establishment clause was to erect a wall of separa29
tion between church and state.
Since Everson, the Court has examined many forms of government
aid to religion. 30 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,3' decided in 1971, the Court
developed a three-part test in an effort to define the permissible limits on
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
22. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1961) (Government aid to religion short of
compulsion does not violate the free exercise clause of the first amendment.).
23. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947).
24. See Van Patten, In the End Is the Beginning: An Inquiry Into the Meaning of the
Religion Clauses, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 7-13 (1983).
25. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
26. Id. at 303.
27. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at 18.
30. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (public grants of veto
power to churches over the issuance of liquor licenses); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
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government aid to religion under the establishment clause. Under the
Lemon test, government action is invalid if it lacks a clear secular pur-

pose, has a primary effect that advances or inhibits religion, or involves

excessive government entanglement with religion. 32 Government aid to
is permissible only if all three prongs of the Lemon test are
religion 33
satisfied.
The first prong of the Lemon analysis, requiring the government to
show a valid secular purpose for the action in question, is a relatively easy
standard to meet. A showing of any probable secular purpose is generally
sufficient, even if the government action happens to coincide with the ten-

ets of some religions. 34 The mere allegation of some secular purpose,

however, is not sufficient. 35 The Supreme Court has overturned state ena
actments when it believed that the stated secular purpose was merely 36
self-serving justification for government action with truly religious aims.
no secular purpose for a governmental action
The Court also has found
37
that is per se religious.
The second prong of the Lemon test prohibits the government from
enacting laws that have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 38 In Hunt v. McNair,39 the Supreme Court defined the term "primary effect" as either public aid flowing to an institution with a primarily
religious mission or as government sponsorship of a specifically religious
(placement of copies of the Ten Commandments in public schools); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws).
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32. Id. at 612-13. In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), the
Court set forth the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test as a two-part test for establishment clause analysis. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970), the Court suggested
that any government action that involved excessive entanglement with religion also violated the
establishment clause. All three factors were integrated into a single test in Lemon, 403 U.S.
602.
33. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
34. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961). The Court showed a similar
"reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states" in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 394 (1983).
35. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
36. See id.
37. Id.; see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963) (noting the
religious nature of the Bible).
38. By excluding only those government activities that have the primary effect of advancing religion, the Court approved, by implication, those forms of aid that indirectly aid religion.
In Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973), the Court found that government activities that provide only indirect, remote, or incidental benefits to religion meet the
constitutional requirements of the primary effect prong of the Lemon test. The difference between government activity that indirectly aids religion and activity that has the primary effect
of advancing religion is explained by the definition of primary effect provided in Nyquist's companion case, Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973). See infra text accompanying notes 3940.
39. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting. 40
The third prong of the Lemon test prohibits government action that
excessively entangles the state with religion. 41 The entanglement inquiry
is divided into two components. First, the state must avoid administrative entanglement with religious authorities. 42 The purpose of this prohibition is to avoid government entanglement in the administration of the
church and to prevent church direction of government activities. 43 Comprehensive and continuing state surveillance of religion is clearly repugnant to the principles that underlie the first amendment. 44 Church
administration of government policies creates a fusion of governmental
and religious functions that comes perilously close to state establishment
45
of religion.
Second, the Supreme Court has indicated that impermissible entanglement may occur when government activity creates the danger of political fragmentation and divisiveness along religious lines. 46 This inquiry
47
has never provided the sole basis for invalidating governmental action,
and the strength of this objection always has been somewhat unclear.
Moreover, recent court decisions threaten the viability of the political divisiveness inquiry as a barrier to government conduct outside of the very
limited context of direct subsidies to religious institutions. 48
Until recently, the Lemon test provided the only standard for establishment clause analysis. In 1982, however, the Court in Larson v. Valente 49 rejected the applicability of the Lemon test in cases analyzing state
statutes that discriminate among religions 50 and applied a strict scrutiny
analysis instead. 5 1 The Larson Court concluded that a state law granting
a denominational preference to one religion over another "must be invalidated unless it is justified by a compelling govenmental interest and unless
it is closely fitted to further that interest."' 52 Under this analysis, the
Court invalidated a Minnesota statute requiring religious organizations
40. Id. at 743.
41. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
42. Id. at 614-15.
43. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982).
44. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
45. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982). As Chief Justice Burger
observed, "[T]he core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause is preventing 'a fusion of
governmental and religious functions.'" Id. at 126 (quoting Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
46. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-24.
47. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364 (1984) (plurality opinion).

48. Id. at 1364-65.
49. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
50. Id. at 252. Nevertheless, the majority implied that the discriminatory statute at issue
in Larson violated the entanglement prong of the Lemon test. See id. at 251-53.
5 I.
Id. at 252.
52. Id. at 247.

January 1986]

RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS

that solicited more than fifty percent of their funds from nonmembers to
comply with detailed registration and reporting requirements.5 3 Because
54
the statute imposed selective burdens only on certain denominations,
the Court stated that the statute could only be justified if it furthered a
compelling governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.55 While the Court determined that Minnesota's statute furthered
the compelling governmental interest of preventing fraud among charitable institutions, the Court found that the statute was not narrowly tailored to prevent fraud. 56 On this basis, the Court concluded that the
57
statute was unconstitutional.
Establishment Clause Analysis and Religious Displays
During the thirty-five years that followed Everson 5 8 the Supreme
Court never squarely addressed the problem of publicly-funded displays
of religious symbols. Lower federal and state courts reached different
conclusions regarding the propriety of such displays under the federal
Constitution.5 9
While the permissibility of such displays remained in doubt, the
Supreme Court had prohibited the government from conveying religious
60
messages in certain contexts. In Abington School District v. Schempp,
bible reading in public schools was held to have an impermissible purpose
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 255.
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 255.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 27-

29.
59. Federal cases upholding government-sponsored religious displays under the first
amendment include Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (government-sponsored
Christmas pageant included a creche, but government aid limited to noncreche aspects of the
pageant); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir.) (stone monolith containing
Ten Commandments placed on public land), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1981) (government-financed creche). One federal court invalidated a government-sponsored religious display
under the first amendment in ACLU v. Rathbun County Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d
1098 (11th Cir. 1983) (government-financed cross).
Some state courts have upheld religious displays under the first amendment. See, e.g., Paul
v. Dade County, 202 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (government-financed cross), cert denied,
207 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968); Lawrence v. Buchmueller, 40
Misc. 2d 300, 243 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (government-financed creche); Baer v.
Kolmorgen, 14 Misc. 2d 1015, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (creche placed on public
school grounds); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558 P.2d 338
(1976) (cross placed in public park), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977). One state court invalidated a government-sponsored religious display under the first amendment in Lowe v. City of
Eugene, 254 Or. 518, 463 P.2d 360 (1969) (cross placed in public park), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1042 (1970).
60. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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and, therefore, to violate the establishment clause. In Schempp, Justice
Clark observed that the government's purpose in requiring bible reading
"the place of the Bible as an instrument
was undeniably religious because
' 61
gainsaid.
be
cannot
of religion
In Engel v. Vitale,62 the Court explained that government-sponsored
religious messages should be prohibited because of their coercive effect on
minority religions. 6 3 This case involved a constitutional challenge to an
official, nondenominational prayer mandated by the New York Regents
for use in the public schools. 64 The Engel Court was deeply concerned
that public sponsorship of religion would place indirect pressure on members of minority religions to conform. 65 In the words of Justice Black,
writing for the majority, "one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of
the individual to worship in his own way lay in the government placing its
official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services. ' '66 The Engel Court majority also emphasized that the establishment clause stands for the proposition that
"religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed
perversion' " by the civil magistrate. 67 As a result, the Court held the
prayer unconstitutional and suggested that "each separate government in
this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves .... "68
In 1980, the Court analyzed the first amendment limits on government sponsorship of tangible, physical displays of religious symbols for
the first time. In Stone v. Graham,69 the Supreme Court struck down a
Kentucky statute that authorized the posting of copies of the Ten Commandments in public school rooms throughout the state. The plaques on
which the Commandments were printed bore a message noting the secuCommandments as the fundamental legal code
lar application of the Ten
70
of Western civilization.
Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the legislature's proclaimed secular purpose as self-serving. 7 1 The Court believed that the real purpose of
61. Id. at 224.
62. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
63. See id. at 435-36.
64. The Regents had recommended that all children recite the following prayer each day
in the presence of their teacher: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
65. Id. at 431.
66. Id. at 429.
67. Id. at 432 (quoting J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 187 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)).
68. Engel, 370 U.S. at 435.
69. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
70. Id. at 41.
71. Id.
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the legislature could be assumed because "[t]he Ten Commandments are
undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legisla72
tive recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact."
Thus, the Court found that the law authorizing the plaques lacked any
clear secular purpose. 73 Having decided that the statute failed to meet the
first prong of the Lemon test, the Court felt no need to examine the statute under the other prongs of the Lemon test and held the statute
unconstitutional. 74
The Court's decisions in each of these cases strongly condemn government-sponsored religious messages. In each case, the Court focused
on the character of the government's activity. The magnitude of the government aid involved was unimportant. The Court thereby consistently
75
rejected any de minimis principle in establishment clause analysis.
Three years after Stone, the Court in Marsh v. Chambers7 6 stepped

back from its strong position against government-sponsored religious
messages. In Marsh, the Court upheld the Nebraska legislature's employment with public funds of a chaplain to deliver an invocation at the opening of each legislative session. 77 The Court ignored the Lemon test
without comment. 78 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, never
addressed whether the primary effect of the practice aided religion or
whether the state's purpose was to aid religion. 79 According to the majority, employment of legislative chaplains was an accepted practice of the

First Congress, which ratified the Bill of Rights. 80 Consequently, the
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 40-43. The Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun, Stewart, and Rehnquist refused to join in the Stone opinion. Id. at 43.
75. See id. at 42. As Justice Clark noted in Schempp, "It is no defense to urge that the
religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The
breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent
....
" Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225; see also Engel, 370 U.S. at 436 (quoting J. MADISON, supra
note 67, at 185-86).
76. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
77. Id. at 786.
78. See id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Instead, Chief Justice Burger concluded that Nebraska's employment of legislative
chaplains "presents no more potential for establishment [of religion]" than school transportation of parochial students (approved in Everson, 330 U.S. 1), construction grants for religious
universities (approved in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)), or property tax exemptions for churches (approved in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)). Marsh, 463 U.S.
at 791. By comparing government aid to religion in the principal case to that in Everson, Tilton, and Walz, the Chief Justice overlooked the justifications for government aid in each of
those previous cases. Chief Justice Burger's use of comparisons in establishment clause analysis
is discussed infra notes 98-104 & accompanying text.
80. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-88. Justice Brennan points out in his dissent, however, that
this practice was not universally accepted. James Madison, in his later writings, expressed
doubts about the propriety of legislative chaplains. Id. at 807-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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practice could not be held to violate the establishment clause. 8 '
The majority distinguished the legislative prayers at issue in Marsh
from the school prayer at issue in Schempp8 2 and Engel.s3 The majority
noted that adult audiences at legislative meetings are less susceptible to
religious indoctrination and peer pressure than children and, therefore,
require less protection against state-sponsored religious exercises.8 4 The
majority also stated that the employment of legislative chaplains was a
part of the fabric of our society and as such was nothing more than "a
tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this
85
country."
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Marsh, the majority's
opinion was too narrow to pose a significant threat to the establishment
clause. 86 Few government practices aiding religion could be justified
under establishment clause analysis based on official acknowledgement of
their propriety by the First Congress.
Despite the narrow scope of the holding in Marsh, the decision represented a major change in the Court's outlook. The Court no longer insisted that the government stay out of the business of prayers. Instead,
the Chief Justice seemed to indicate that, in certain situations, majority
religionists are entitled to special acknowledgments of their beliefs
through official state action. The majority in Marsh approved a government action that the Court in Engel felt tended dangerously toward an
87
establishment of religion.
The magnitude of the Court's retreat from its position in Stone
against government-sponsored religious messages became more apparent
81. The Chief Justice observed that "[it can hardly be thought that in the same week
Members of the First Congress voted to appoint and to pay a chaplain for each House and also
voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for submission to the states, they intended
the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable."

Id. at 790 (majority opinion).
82. See supra notes 60-61 & accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 62-64 & accompanying text.

84. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 795 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. The Marsh Court accepted the invocation of divine guidance by the state legislature as

a "part of the fabric of our society." Id. at 792 (majority opinion). The Court saw nothing
wrong with "tolerable acknowledgment" of Christian beliefs, id., and admonished the respondents for their lack of "'ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere
shadow.'" Id. at 795 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 213 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
In Engel, 370 U.S. 421, the majority strongly disapproved of government sponsorship of
one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services. See id. at 429-30. The
Court suggested that such sponsorship violated the establishment clause because "[w]hen the
power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious

belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Id. at 431.
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in Lynch v. Donnelly.88 In Lynch, the Court reexamined the limits on
government sponsorship of sacred religious symbols. The Court upheld
the inclusion of a Nativity scene depicting the birth of Christ as part of a
Christmas display built and maintained by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island. 9 The display also included a Christmas tree, striped poles, a
Santa Claus house, an elephant, a clown, a teddy bear, a wishing well,
colored lights, reindeer, and a sleigh. 90
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality, 9 1 initially refused to
commit the Court to the Lemon test.92 The Chief Justice insisted that
"[w]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any
single test or criterion." 93 The Court had departed from the Lemon test
before, and the Court indicated its willingness to depart from it in the
future. In fact, Chief Justice Burger's application of the three-prong
Lemon test in Lynch was a radical departure from traditional establishment clause doctrine.
First, Chief Justice Burger found that the creche served the legiti94
mate secular purpose of depicting the historical origins of Christmas.
He did not attempt to explain, however, how a government-sponsored
display of a peculiarly Christian version of history advanced secular
knowledge. The Court, in fact, departed from the rationale of Stone,
which indicated that the lack of a valid secular purpose sometimes can be
assumed from the religious nature of a display. 95 The place of the creche
as an instrument of religion, like that of the Bible and the Ten Commandments, cannot be gainsaid. As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent in
Lynch, the creche is "the chief symbol of the characteristically Christian
belief that a divine Saviour was brought into the world and that the purpose of this miraculous birth was to illuminate a path toward salvation
88. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (plurality opinion).
89. Id. at 1358.
90. Id.
91. In addition to the Chief Justice, the plurality consisted of Justices White, Powell, and
Rehnquist.
92. Id. at 1361-62.
93. Id. at 1362. Justice O'Connor, writing a lone concurring opinion, suggested a "clarification" of the Lemon test. Id. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's test
focused on government entanglement with religion, on the government's purpose in the questioned activity, and on the message the questioned activity conveys to the general public. Id. at
1366-67. Concentrating on the celebratory nature of the creche, Justice O'Connor concluded
that the display did not violate the establishment clause because it did not have the effect of
communicating an endorsement of Christianity. Id. at 1369.
94. Id. at 1363 (plurality opinion). The Chief Justice also rejected as irrelevant Justice
Brennan's suggestion that the goals of the city might have been accomplished solely through
secular means. Id. at 1363 n.7. This conclusion is particularly ironic, since the Chief Justice
found the existence of alternative means highly relevant in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116, 123-24 (1982), decided just two years prior to Lynch.
95. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 n.3 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224).
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and redemption. ' 96 Under the rationale of Stone, no assertion of9 7a supposed secular purpose could have blinded the Court to that fact.
The Court's examination of the primary effect of the display also was
unprecedented. The Court did not examine the primary effect of the
creche itself, and did not allege that the primary effect of the creche was
to serve some legitimate secular purpose. Instead, the Court attempted to
measure the magnitude of the benefit conferred upon religion by the inclusion of the creche in the Christmas display. 98 Thus, the Court recognized a de minimis factor in establishment clause analysis that prior case
law consistently had rejected. 99
In an apparent disregard of precedent, the Chief Justice refused to
view the creche as having a primary effect that advanced religion, unless
the creche was more beneficial to religion than other types of aid held
permissible in the past. 100 The Court concluded that the intangible aid of
erecting a single, highly visible display of a sacred religious symbol conferred no greater benefit upon religion than textbook loans to parochial
schools and was no more an endorsement of religion than Sunday closing
laws. 01 Because the creche benefited religion in an insignificant way,
Chief Justice Burger found that the second prong of the Lemon test was
satisfied. 102

Comparison of past establishment clause cases10 3 to ascertain an acceptable magnitude of benefits bestowed upon religion threatens the rationale of those cases cited as precedent by the Lynch Court. The Lynch
plurality failed to realize that the only thing similar in the primary effect
96. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 ("an 'avowed' secular purpose not sufficient to avoid conflict
with the First Amendment").
98. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363-64.
99. The Court categorized the aid to religion provided by the creche as indirect and incidental. Id. at 1364. The Chief Justice observed that "[tihis case differs significantly from [past
cases] where religion was substantially aided .... No comparable benefit to religion is discerni-

ble here." Id.
100. See Fausto v. Diamond, 589 F. Supp. 451, 466 (D.R.I. 1984) ("Lynch appears to recognize a de minimus factor which the prior caselaw decried." (citations omitted)). In contrast,
see Stone, 449 U.S. at 42 (" 'This is not a case... where the Bible may constitutionally be used
in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like.' ")
(quoting Schempp, 373 U.S. at 225). See supra note 75.
101. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363.
102. Id.
103. These cases included Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (prayer in the legislature); Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (noncategorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and
universities); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (grants for the construction of buildings
on religious campuses); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions for church
property); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans to parochial schools);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952) (release time from public schools for voluntary religious training); and Everson,
330 U.S. I (reimbursement for the transportation of parochial schoolchildren).
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analysis utilized in all of these cases was the required examination of the
unique religious and secular aspects of the specific government activity
that was presently under review. 10 4
In its application of the entanglement prong of the Lemon test, the
Lynch Court further constricted the scope of establishment clause analysis. The Court concluded that inclusion of the creche caused no administrative entanglement because there was no evidence of contact between
government and religious authorities.1 05 In addition, Chief Justice Burger
implied that political entanglement is an irrelevant consideration, except
in cases involving direct subsidies to religious institutions. 106 This contention, however, defies recent case law and contradicts the Court's reasoning in Larkin v. Grendel'sDen, Inc. 107
In Grendel's Den, decided in 1982, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts ordinance that gave churches the power to veto the issuance of
liquor licenses to commercial enterprises located within 500 feet of
church premises. Even though the case did not involve direct subsidies,
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, expressed his concern that
"[t]he challenged statute... enmeshes churches in the processes of government and creates the danger of '[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines.' "108
Finally, the Lynch plurality decided that erection of the creche did
104. The plurality opinion in Lynch compared the benefit to religion conferred by Pawtucket's display with the benefit conferred on religion by other establishment clause decisions.
104 S.Ct. at 1363. The Court cited, inter alia, Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968),
which allowed public school districts to loan secular textbooks to parochial schools. The Allen
Court emphasized that parochial schools have two goals, religious instruction and secular instruction. Id. at 247. The majority was able to uphold the enactment because "the processes of
secular and religious training are [not] so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion." Id. at 248.
The Lynch decision also cited McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Lynch, 104 S.
Ct. at 1363. McGowan upheld Maryland's Sunday closing law against an establishment clause
challenge. The Court in McGowan emphasized how the nature of Sunday closing laws had
changed. While these laws initially had religious objectives, McGowan, 366 U.S. at 431-33,
present-day Sunday closing laws were enacted to set apart one day as a uniform day of rest, a
day that all members of the family and community could spend together. Id. at 450. The
McGowan Court noted that Sunday closing laws "have become part and parcel of this great
governmental concern wholly apart from their original purposes or connotations." Id. at 445.
In examining the magnitude of the aid to religion in these cases, the Lynch Court ignored
the nature of the aid involved. Chief Justice Burger never claimed that Pawtucket's display
served some great governmental concern, as in McGowan, or was separable from religious
objectives, as in Allen. As mere exemplars of the permissible magnitude of government aid to
religion, the opinions in McGowan and Allen have lost all of their ingenuity, subtlety, and
reasoning.
105. Lynch, 104 S.Ct. at 1364.
106. Id. at 1364-65.
107. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
108. Id. at 127 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623).
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not violate the rule established in Larson v. Valente,109 which prohibited
discrimination among religions in the absence of a compelling state interest.1 0 The plurality concluded that erection of the creche was not "explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated by Larson.""' This
conclusion appears to indicate that the Lynch Court has limited the applicability of Larson to a statute that patently discriminates among religions
12
on its face.'
Thus, the Lynch Court held that the display at issue was constitutional under the tests established in both Lemon and Larson. It is not
certain, however, that Lynch constitutes a blanket endorsement of all government-sponsored religious displays. The Lynch Court's holding was
predicated in part on the fact that Chief Justice Burger evaluated the Nativity scene in the context of the larger Christmas display. 113 When
viewed as a part of a larger display, the creche passed constitutional muster. Thus, it remains unclear whether a government-sponsored Nativity
scene or a cross standing alone would violate the establishment clause." 14
Most significantly, the tone of the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch
was very different from that in prior Supreme Court cases analyzing government aid to religion. Past decisions emphasized concern regarding
whether official support of religion might affect freedom of worship by
placing indirect pressure on minority religionists to conform.' 15 In contrast, the plurality opinion in Lynch emphasizes the need to accommodate
America's religious heritage.
The Lynch Court catalogued long-standing government recognition
of religion. 16 The Court praised this official recognition of religion as an
accommodation of religious beliefs that follows " 'the best of our traditions' " by respecting " 'the religious nature of our people.' ""7 The
109. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
110. See supra note 52 & accompanying text.
111. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366 n.13.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1362.
114. The federal courts have taken different stands on the issue. Compare McCreary v.
Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.) (upholding a creche standing alone), aff'd by an equally divided
court sub nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) with ACLU v. Birmingham, 588 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (enjoining a creche standing alone).
115. See supra notes 65-66 accompanying text.
116. Lynch, 104 U.S. at 1359-61.
117. Id. at 1361 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). The Court also
noted that "the Constitution... affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance,
of all religions." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359. The Court has allowed, and sometimes even required, the government to accommodate religious belief by exempting religionists from certain
publicly-imposed burdens, including military service, Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
453 (1971), and public school attendance, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952). The creche at issue in Lynch, however, cannot
be viewed as a mere accommodation of religious belief. "While the Free Exercise Clause clearly
prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant
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Court's generalized approval of official religiousness in Lynch suggests,
even more strongly than in Marsh,118 that the Court is willing to allow
government sponsorship of religion that it considers no more than "a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country." 119

The current position of the Supreme Court regarding establishment
clause analysis of religious displays seems most uncertain. 120 Lynch has
questioned the general applicability of a constitutional test once thought
mandatory without offering any clear alternatives. Furthermore, Lynch
has analyzed both the purposes and effects of government enactments in
contradiction to settled establishment clause doctrine. 121 Finally, Lynch
examined the magnitude of challenged aid to religion in spite of the
Supreme Court's earlier insistence that government aid in support of religion, however minor, violated the establishment clause.
Although Lynch represents the Supreme Court's last word on the
permissibility of government-sponsored religious displays, the Court, in
its 1984 term, provided some new guidance in analyzing government
action under the establishment clause. 122 In Wallace v. Jaffree,123 the
Court used the purpose prong of the Lemon test to invalidate an Alabama
statute that provided for a moment of silence "for meditation and voluntary prayer" in all public schools. 124 The sponsor of the statute had testithat a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its [religious] beliefs."
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226 (emphasis in original), quoted in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479,
2491 n.45 (1985).
118. See supra notes 76-87 & accompanying text.
119. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
120. In the area of religious displays, the federal courts are more confused than ever. Some
federal courts have upheld government-sponsored religious displays under Lynch. See, e.g.,
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom.
Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985); Fausto v. Diamond, 589 F. Supp. 451
(D.R.I. 1984). Other federal courts have limited the holding in Lynch and invalidated government-sponsored religious displays. See, eg., Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, No. 821064 (10th Cir. Dec. 26, 1985) (en bane); Libin v. Greenwich, No. B-84-805 (D. Conn. Dec. 10,
1985); ACLU v. City of St. Charles, No. 85-C-09917 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1985); Burelle v.
Nashua, 599 F. Supp. 792 (D.N.H. 1984); Greater Houston Chapter of ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F.
Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1984); ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 558 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Mich.
1984).
121. See supra notes 94-104 & accompanying text.
122. In addition to the decision in Jaffree v. Wallace, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985), discussed infra
notes 123-28 & accompanying text, the Supreme Court rendered three other decisions holding
government activities unconstitutional under the three-part Lemon test. In Aguilar v. Felton,
105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985), and Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985), the Court invalidated
two statutes that provided public teachers and public monies for the remedial teaching of secular subjects at religious schools. In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985),
the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that required employers to allow their employees
not to work on the employee's chosen Sabbath.
123. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
124. Id. at 2482.
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fled that the sole purpose of the statute was to return prayer to the
schools. 12 5 At the time this statute was enacted, Alabama law already
provided for a moment of silence in all public schools "for meditation."

12 6

Applying the first prong of the Lemon test, the majority found that
the statute "was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose-indeed
the statute had no secular purpose."' 127 Thus, the Court held that the
statute violated the establishment clause.
The narrowness of the decision in Jaffree, however, limits its impact
as precedent.1 28 Few government activities can be invalidated based on
frank admissions by state authorities that they intend to further religious
belief. At best, the Jaffree decision provides only minimal protection
against government aid to religion.
In light of the lingering uncertainties of federal establishment clause
analysis, it is not surprising that the California Supreme Court has criticized the United States Supreme Court for treating the establishment
clause in " 'various factual situations with perplexing diversity of
views.' "129 Those challenging government aid to religion, however, need
not rely solely on the uncertainties of federal establishment clause doctrine. California's constitution, for example, provides broader protections
against official sponsorship of religious activities. Other states have similar broad constitutional provisions limiting public aid to religion. This
Note next examines the California courts' interpretation of its religion
clauses in order to provide a model for other states to follow in the interpretation of parallel state guarantees.
125. Id. at 2483.
126. Id. at 2481. Although plaintiff contended at trial that this statute also violated the
establishment clause, plaintiff did not contest the validity of this statute before the Supreme
Court. Id. at 2482.
127. Id. at 2490 (emphasis in original). Because the statute failed to meet the threshold
requirement of a clear secular purpose, the majority never analyzed the statute under either the
effect or entanglement prongs of the Lemon test.
128. A majority of the justices on the Court indicated that a statute authorizing only a
moment of silence would be constitutional. Id. at 2493 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2496
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2505 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 2520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Two justices would uphold a moment of silence
statute if a clear secular purpose could be discerned justifying the statute. Id. at 2493 (Powell,
J., concurring); id. at 2497-501 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Three justices of the Court approved of the statute at issue in Jaffree. Id. at 2505-08 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2508
(White, J., dissenting); id. at 2508-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even the majority opinion
observed that "legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school day." Id. at 2491 (majority opinion).
129. Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 795, 587 P.2d 663, 664, 150 Cal. Rptr.
867, 868 (1978) (quoting Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 31 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973)).
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California Law on Religious Displays
In contrast to the United States Constitution, the California Constitution contains three separate provisions limiting government aid to religion. Article I, section 4 embodies two provisions that parallel both
religion clauses in the first amendment. Similar to the federal establishment clause, section 4 provides: "The Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." 130 Similar to the federal free
exercise clause, section 4 also provides: "Free exercise and enjoyment of
religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed." 13 1 In addition, article XVI, section 5 prohibits the state government from granting "anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian
purpose." 1 32 Finally, article IX, section 8 prohibits the use of public
133
money for sectarian schools.
The scope of each of these provisions, however, is not determined by
the scope of parallel federal guarantees. Under California law, the courts
of California have been free to interpret the guarantees of the California
Constitution independently of federal interpretations of parallel federal
guarantees. 134 In 1974, the voters of California passed a constitutional
initiative reaffirming the independent nature of California's constitutional
guarantees. Article I, section 24 of the California Constitution was
amended to provide: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not de' 35
pendent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution."'
California's Establishment Clause
The Legal Basis for Independent State Interpretation
On November 5, 1974, the voters of California approved article I,
130. CAL. CONST. art I, § 4. Article I, § 4 provides in full:
Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The Legislature shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. A person is not incompetent to be a witness
or juror because of his or her opinion on religious beliefs.

Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. art. XVI, § 5. For the full text of § 5, see infra note 237.
133. Article IX, § 8 provides:
No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or denominational school, or any school not under the exclusive control of the officers of
the public schools; nor shall any sectarian or denominational doctrine be taught, or
instruction thereon be permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools
of this State.
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
134. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315, 328 (1975) ("This court has always assumed the independent vitality of our state

Constitution.").
135. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 24.
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section 24 of the California Constitution,1 36 which reaffirmed the independent nature of California's constitutional guarantees. 137 During the
same election, a prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of
religion" was added by initiative to article I, section 4 of the California
Constitution. 138 Although this language is identical to the establishment
clause of the federal Constitution, 139 the interpretation of the two clauses
has not been entirely parallel.
The United States Supreme Court has not opposed such differences
in interpretation. The Supreme Court has long recognized the right of the
states to interpret textually similar passages of state constitutions in a
broader manner than parallel federal guarantees.140 Federal courts have
no authority to review California courts' interpretations of its state constitution, even if these decisions also analyze federal law. A state court decision is shielded from federal review as long as the state relied upon
adequate and independent state grounds in reaching its conclusion.' 4 1
At one time, the California Supreme Court deferred to federal interpretations of the federal Constitution as binding authority on California's
courts in interpreting textually similar passages of California's constitution, absent a showing of cogent reasons supporting a varying interpretation. 14 2 Recent decisions of the California Supreme Court, however,
interpret California's establishment clause more broadly than parallel federal standards. 143 For more than a decade, the California Supreme Court
has shown less deference to federal analysis in interpreting the scope of
136. Id.
137. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 551, 531 P.2d 1099, 1114, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315, 330 (1975) (The voters' "declaration of consitutional independence.., was a mere reaffirmation of existing law.").
138. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; see text accompanying note 130; see also Mandel v. Hodges,
54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 616, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 257 (1976). Article I, § 4 already included
language guaranteeing the free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or
preference.
139. See supra note 1 for the text of the first amendment.
140. See, e.g., Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1965).
141. As the Court observed in Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935): "Where the
judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other nonfederal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal
ground and adequate to support the judgment." Id. at 210. State court decisions are shielded
from federal review only if the judgment clearly relies upon independent state grounds. The
United States Supreme Court recently announced that it will assume that state court decisions
resting on both state and federal law are reviewable by the federal courts "when the adequacy
and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion
.... Michigan
.
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
142. This approach was taken in Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal. 2d 85, 89, 82 P.2d
391, 392-93 (1938); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School, 68 Cal. App 3d 1, 15,
137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 51 (1982), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); and Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 595, 616, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 257 (1976).
143. See infra notes 176-85 & accompanying text.
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many individual rights under the California Constitution. 14 The California Supreme Court has recognized that state courts are the ultimate arbiters of all state law.145 Thus, California courts independently may
construe provisions of the California Constitution that parallel federal
law, as long as they do not restrict liberties granted under the federal

Constitution. 146
Recent Developments
Until 1984, the independent potential of California's establishment
clause was largely ignored. In Feminist Women's Health Center v.
1 47
however, decided just three months after Lynch, the CaliPhilibosian,
fornia Court of Appeal interpreted the California establishment clause independently of the federal Constitution for the first time. 148 In
Philibosian,the Los Angeles District Attorney's office had come into possession of 16,500 aborted fetuses. Police had seized the fetuses from the
home of a private physician, and the District Attorney held the fetuses as
potential evidence of criminal conduct.149 The District Attorney had attempted to release the fetuses to a right-to-life group that planned to hold
150
a memorial service, but a trial court enjoined the impending release.
The District Attorney's office then announced its intention to inter the
fetuses at Valhalla Cemetery, which had volunteered to store the fetuses
free of charge. When this plan was announced, the Catholic League of
144. Compare Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (privately-owned shopping
center may prohibit speech without violating the first amendment) with Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 154 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979) (privately-owned
shopping center required by California Constitution to permit speech on premises), aff'd, 447
U.S. 74 (1980); compare United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (full-body search following traffic arrest does not violate federal Constitution) with People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d
528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) (full-body search following traffic arrest violates
California Constitution).
145. See supra note 134 & accompanying text.
146. People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297,
302 n.4 (1975).
147. 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918, hearingdenied, 688 P.2d 160, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 74 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1752 (1985).
148. Id. at 1085-86, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23. Although three California cases have considered California's establishment clause, Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d
663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School, 68 Cal. App.
3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d
595, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976), all three cases refused to interpret the clause beyond the federal
analysis of the federal establishment clause. See supra note 142 & accompanying text. The
Philibosian court also interpreted California's free exercise clause. See infra notes 230-35 &
accompanying text.
149. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1081, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
150. Id. at 1082, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 920-21. The disposition of the fetuses quickly became a
cause celebre for conservative politicians. Right-to-life groups, state senators, the Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors, and President Reagan urged the District Attorney's office to
provide a memorial service for the remains. Id. at 1082, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
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Southern California contracted with Valhalla Cemetery to hold a memorial service for the fetuses and place a plaque on the site. 51 The trial
court refused to enjoin the District Attorney from authorizing the
release. 152
The California Court of Appeal in Philibosian unanimously reversed
the trial court, holding the District Attorney's action unconstitutional
under the establishment and free exercise clauses 1 53 of article I, section
4,154 and under article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution. 55
In analyzing the propriety of the proposed release under California's establishment clause, the court first noted that "California courts alone determine the rights guaranteed by the California Constitution so long as
those rights extend equal or greater protection to those guaranteed under
the federal Constitution under totally similar provisions of the Bill of
Rights."'' 56 Thus, the court's analysis of California's establishment clause
was premised upon only certain United States Supreme Court cases that
the California appellate court found persuasive. 157 The court referred to
Lynch 158 only once, agreeing with Chief Justice Burger's assertion that no
single test is definitive in establishment clause analysis. 59 Significantly,
the court did not otherwise refer to Lynch in its application of establishment clause analysis.
The Philibosian court then applied the three-part Lemon test. With
respect to the first prong of the Lemon test, the court announced that it
would determine the purpose behind the District Attorney's proposed action from an objective viewpoint. 60 The court noted that preservation of
the fetuses was no longer required for evidentiary purposes 16 1 and found
no other secular purpose justifying the proposed interment of the fetuses.
Thus, in the court's view, the District Attorney's release of the fetuses
lacked a clear secular purpose. 162 Furthermore, the publicity surrounding the District Attorney's repeated attempts to release the fetuses to prolife groups convinced the court that the proposed interment gave the appearance that the government harbored a religious viewpoint. 63 The
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1083, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 921.

Id. at 1084, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
See infra notes 230-35 & accompanying text.
Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1092, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
155. Id. at 1092-93, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 927; see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. XVI, § 5.
156. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1086, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
157. Id. at 1086, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
158. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 88-121
& accompanying text.
159. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1087-88, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 923-24.
160. The court noted that "[w]e perceive the purpose test to be objective in nature." Id. at
1090, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
161. Id. at 1089, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
162. Id. at 1089-90, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
163. Id. at 1090-91, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26.
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court observed that the symbolic identification of government with religion threatened the fundamental precept that religious concerns must remain matters of" 'individual and community conscience.' "164 Thus, the
court concluded that "'[t]he state must not only maintain the reality of
separation with the church, it must also maintain the appearance of such

separation.'

"165

Applying the second prong of the Lemon test, the court found that
release of the fetuses to Valhalla would have the impermissible primary
effect of advancing religion by giving symbolic governmental support to
the religious views of the Catholic League. 16 6 While the court recognized
that the Catholic League had a constitutionally protected right to proclaim that aborted fetuses are human beings and to mourn them, the
court emphasized that the League had no right to expect state participa1 67
tion in its religious expression.
With respect to the third prong of the Lemon test, the court determined that the state's action caused improper and excessive political entanglement with the Catholic League.1 68 The court concluded that "[t]he
act of indirectly turning the fetuses over to Valhalla would vitiate the
studied neutrality which is the state's constitutional course." 169 Although
the court noted that political entanglements alone cannot support a finding of unconstitutionality under the federal Constitution, it emphasized
that potential political divisiveness is an "important factor" in determining whether there has been an establishment clause violation under the
California Constitution.1 70 On this basis, the court concluded that the
17 1
District Attorney's actions violated all three prongs of the Lemon test.
The court also held that the District Attorney's actions violated the
rule set forth in Larson v. Valente, 172 which prohibits discrimination
among religions in the absence of a compelling state interest. The court
noted that release of the fetuses would give symbolic support to the Catholic League's belief that aborted fetuses are murdered human beings.1 73
Consequently, the court concluded that "any state action showing a preference for this belief ... must be invalidated unless it is justified by a
164. Id. at 1090, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 868 (1978)).
165. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1090, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (citing Fox v. City of Los
Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 804, 587 P.2d 663, 670, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867, 874 (1978) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring)).
166. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1091, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
167. Id. at 1090, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
168. Id. at 1091, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1089, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
172. Id. at 1088, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 924. For a discussion of Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228
(1982), see supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
173. Phiibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1091, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 926.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

compelling governmental interest with which 'it is closely fitted to further
[that] interest.' ",174 Because the law allowed the District Attorney to dispose of fetuses through incineration, the court concluded that interment
at Valhalla would not serve any compelling state interest. 175
The Philibosian court's analysis of California's establishment clause
provides substantial protections against government aid to religion that
are absent under current federal interpretations of the federal establishment clause. The United States Supreme Court has implied that official
acknowledgments of religious belief may serve the legitimate secular goal
of accommodating religion. 176 In contrast, the Philibosian decision emphasized that the state must avoid the appearance, as well as the reality,
17 7
of religious partiality.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has recently appeared
to abandon any attempt to determine the validity of government actions
based on their potential for causing political divisions along religious
lines.' 78 Philibosian, on the other hand, indicates that political divisiveness continues to be an important factor in establishment clause analysis
79
under the California Constitution.1
Finally, the United States Supreme Court has severely limited application of the strict scrutiny standard stated in Larson. 80 Under the
Lynch decision, it appears that only those statutes that facially discriminate among religions are subject to strict scrutiny.' 81 In contrast, the
Philibosian decision requires a compelling state interest to justify any
government activity that prefers one religion over another. 182
Although the Philibosian decision invalidated government participation in a religious ceremony, the Court's rationale seems equally applicable to static religious displays. Government sponsorship of a creche or a
cross, no less than government participation in a memorial service, may
create the appearance of government support for a particular religious
viewpoint. 83 Government involvement with a religious display may lack
a secular purpose, have a primary effect advancing religion, or create
political divisiveness. 18 4 Furthermore, the involvement may prefer one
174. Id. at 1088-89, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 924 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 248-49).
175. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 924-25.
176. See supra notes 117-19 & accompanying text.
177. See supra note 165 & accompanying text.
178. The plurality expressly limited the political divisiveness inquiry to cases involving direct government subsidies to religious institutions. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364-65.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 168-70.
180. 456 U.S. at 247; see supra text accompanying note 52.
181. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366 n.13; see supra text accompanying note 112.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
183. See, e.g., Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 797, 587 P.2d 663, 665, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 867, 869 (1978) (Illumination of a cross on Los Angeles City Hall "does seem preferential

when comparable recognition of other religious symbols is impracticable." (emphasis added)).
184. See, e.g., McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[I]n light of the
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religion over others without any compelling state interest.18 5 To the extent that government involvement with religious displays causes these results, such involvement is inconsistent with the rationale of the
Philibosiandecision.
Thus, the Philibosian court's interpretation of California's establishment clause represents a major departure from current federal establishment clause doctrine. Philibosian,however, is less than two years old and
represents the view of a single appellate court.
More settled protections against state aid to religion are contained in
California's free exercise clause.18 6 For more than 130 years, California's
free exercise clause has guaranteed the free exercise of religion, without
discrimination or preference.
California's Free Exercise Clause
California's establishment clause is only ten years old. 187 In contrast,
California's free exercise clause was proposed prior to California's admission to the union. Article I, section 4 of the California Constitution, as
originally adopted by the California Constitutional Convention of 1849,
proclaimed: "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in
this state." ' 8
Accounts of the proceedings of the 1849 Convention are very
sketchy. The members talked briefly about banning Mormon polygamy
from the protections of the free exercise clause. 189 In order to further
equal treatment of all religions, clergy of the Catholic and.Protestant
division" caused by the placement of a creche in a public park, the Board of Trustees of the
Village of Scarsdale urged that the local creche committee "erect the creche at a location other
than the village owned property."), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
185. See eg., Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1034-35 (1982) (government erection of a
creche in a Christmas display prefers Christianity without any compelling state interest), rev'd
on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (plurality opinion).
186. See supra note 131, infra note 188 & accompanying text.
187. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION,
PROPOSITION 7, at 21 (1974).
188. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 4. The full text of article I, § 4 provided:

The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state; and no person shall be
rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief, but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as
to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of this state.
Id.
189. See J. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON
THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 3839, 292-93 (1850).
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faiths alternated in delivering the invocation. 190
California's courts exhibited similar concerns regarding evenhandedness in the years immediately following the 1849 Convention. In
1858, the California Supreme Court invalidated the state's Sunday closing
law because of concerns that the law established, as a religious institution,
the observance of a day held sacred by the followers of one faith.' 9 1
Shortly thereafter, the California Supreme Court reversed its opinion because it became convinced that the aim of the law was to protect workers. 192 The court found it significant that the law in question "enjoins
nothing which is not secular, and it commands nothing that is
193
religious."
The delegates to the California Constitutional Convention of 1879
were very concerned about religious freedom and the separation of
church and state.194 Consequently, one of the delegates at the convention
proposed an amendment to article I, section 4 providing that free exercise
shall be guaranteed, not simply allowed, in California.95 The sponsor of
the amendment felt that no language could express the convention's commitment to religious freedom too clearly. In his opinion, "the word 'allowed' conveys the idea that the right to disallow or deny exists ....
I
deny that any Government or any power on earth has a right to grant or
deny freedom of religious belief."' 1 96 The majority of the convention
agreed with him. As a result, article I, section 4 now reads: "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed."' 197 This provision of the California Constitution has been
described as "more than a guarantee of religious toleration, it is a guarantee of religious equality." 1 98 In this respect, California law significantly
differs from its federal counterpart. While the federal free exercise clause
prohibits government interference with religious exercise, 199 California's
190. See P. CONMY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL BEGINNINGS OF CALIFORNIA 18 (1959).
191. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 505 (1858), overruled,Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678
(1861). The United States Supreme Court noted in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 435
(1961), that Newman is the only American case holding Sunday closing laws unconstitutional.
192. Exparte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678, 682-83 (1861).
193. Id. at 685. Even after the Andrews decision, however, the California Supreme Court
remained sharply divided over the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws. In Ex parte Koser,
60 Cal. 177 (1882), those favoring Sunday closing laws obtained a bare majority of four votes to
three. Three vigorous dissents sharply questioned the validity of Sunday closing laws under
article I, § 4 of the California Constitution. See id. at 201-15 (McKinstry, Ross & Sharpstein,
JJ., dissenting).
194. See infra notes 239-41 & accompanying text.
195. 3 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1171 (1881).

196. Id. (remarks of Mr. O'Sullivan).
197. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
198. 25 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 316, 320 (1955).
199. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (explaining the differences between the
establishment clause and the free exercise clause).
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free exercise clause additionally prohibits government preferences in favor
2°
of, or discriminations against, one religion over another.
Although the sweep of California's free exercise clause is very broad,
not all laws aiding religion have been held to violate its ban on governmental religious preferences. Government actions that aid religion do not
violate the mandate of California's free exercise clause as long as such
actions are religiously neutral. For example, in California Educational
Facilities Authority v. Priest,20 1 the California Supreme Court upheld a
statute authorizing the issuance of tax free bonds by all private universi202
ties against challenges that it violated California's free exercise clause.
The statute applied equally to sectarian and nonsectarian institutions.
The majority reasoned that the statute was not proscribed by California's
free exercise clause because "[t]he Act is religiously neutral; it neither
favors, fosters, nor establishes any religion .... -203
Mandel v. Hodges 2 4 also illustrates the importance of government
neutrality toward religious matters under California's free exercise clause.
In Mandel, the California Court of Appeal sustained an injunction
against the Governor that prevented him from designating Good Friday
as a paid state holiday.2 0 5 The court recognized that the express terms of
California's free exercise clause prohibit discrimination against, or preference in favor of, one religion as opposed to any other. 20 6 The court reasoned that the appointment of an exclusively Christian holy day as a paid
holiday amounted to discrimination against all non-Christians and prefer20 7
ence in favor of Christians.
Religious Displays Under California'sFree Exercise Clause
In 1979, the California Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a religious display under California's free exercise clause for the first
time. In Fox v. City of Los Angeles,20 8 the California Supreme Court sustained an injunction against the city of Los Angeles prohibiting the display of a single-barred latin cross on City Hall. 20 9 The city had used
200. See Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 796, 587 P.2d 663, 665, 150 Cal. Rptr.
867, 869 (1978).
201. 12 Cal. 3d 593, 526 P.2d 513, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974).
202. Id. at 606, 526 P.2d at 521, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
203. Id. at 603, 526 P.2d at 520, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 368. The court also upheld the statute
against the proscriptions of article XVI, § 5 of the California Constitution. See infra notes 25057 & accompanying text.
204. 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976).
205. Id. at 601-02, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
206. Id. at 617, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
207. Id.
208. 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
209. The cross in question was a single-barred latin cross commonly used in Protestant and
Catholic faiths, not the double-barred cross used by Greek and Eastern Orthodox churches.
See id. at 794, 587 P.2d at 664, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
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public funds to display the cross at Christmas for the previous thirty years
and on Latin Easter Sunday for the previous decade. 210 In response to
demands by members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the city also kept
21
the cross lighted on Orthodox Easter. '
Recognizing the inherent ambiguities of the federal establishment
clause, 21 2 the California Supreme Court chose to analyze the display
under California's free exercise clause. 21 3 The court noted that California's free exercise clause forbids the government from discriminating
against, or exhibiting preferences toward, one religion over another. The
court was uncertain whether federal interpretations
of the United States
2 14
Constitution were that comprehensive.
The Fox court adopted a sympathetic attitude towards the plight of
religious minorities. The city of Los Angeles argued that, since it had
lighted the cross without objection for thirty years, the lighting of the
cross conferred no measurable benefit upon Christians. 215 The court refused to accept this argument, reasoning that "[t]here may be complex
and troubling reasons why residents who are non-Christians have chosen
not to seek equal recognition and aid."' 2 16 Additionally, the court rejected
the city of Los Angeles's argument that the cross was merely "symbolic of
the spirit of peace and good fellowship toward all mankind" 2 17 and recognized the religious nature of the display.
The city also argued that, by keeping the cross lighted on Orthodox
Easter, the city was accommodating other religions rather than preferring
one religion over another. 21 8 The court stated that this accommodation
could not undo the preference because "[t]he city hall is not an immense
bulletin board where symbols of all faiths could be displayed. ' 219 In the
210. Id. at 794, 587 P.2d at 663-64, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68. Latin and Orthodox Easter
Sundays commonly occur on different dates in the same year. See id. at 796, 587 P.2d at 665,
150 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
211. Id. at 796, 587 P.2d at 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
212. The trial court had enjoined the display as a violation of the federal establishment
clause. The court of appeal, interpreting federal establishment clause doctrine differently, reversed the injunction. Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. App. 3d 885, 139 Cal. Rptr. 180
(1977), vacated, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).

213. See Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at 795, 587 P.2d at 664-65, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
214. Id. at 796, 587 P.2d at 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
215. Id. at 797, 587 P.2d at 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
216. Id. In addition, the court perceived that the federal establishment clause imposed a
separate duty of religious neutrality. In the court's view, "[t]o be neutral surely means to honor
the beliefs of the silent as well as the vocal minorities." Id. at 799, 587 P.2d at 666, 150 Cal.
Rptr. at 870.
217. Id. at 798, 587 P.2d at 666, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
218. Id. at 796-97, 587 P.2d at 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
219. Id. at 797, 587 P.2d at 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 869. On this basis, the majority distinguished the facts of Fox from those of Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54,
222 P. 801 (1924). In Evans, the California Supreme Court upheld a school district's purchase
of a Bible for a public school library against a challenge based on California Political Code
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court's view, illumination of a single religious symbol "does seem preferential when comparable recognition of other religious symbols is impracticable. '2 20 Thus, the court concluded that the city's illumination of the
cross violated the prohibition in California's free exercise
clause against
22 1
government preference of one religion over another.
The California Supreme Court's interpretation of California's free
exercise clause in Fox substantially differs from federal interpretations of
the federal establishment clause in three respects. First, the Fox decision
requires the government to refrain from special recognition of one religion when comparable recognition is not available for all religions. 222 In
contrast, the Lynch decision allows the government to sponsor the use of
sacred symbols of one religion, without regard to any
actual or perceived
223
favoritism that may result from such sponsorship.
Second, the California Supreme Court has recognized that there is a
significant difference between government sponsorship of secular symbols
and government sponsorship of spiritual symbols to commemorate national holidays. 224 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has permitted the government to use religious symbols to serve the secular
225
purpose of commemorating holidays.
Finally, the California Supreme Court has exhibited a sympathetic
attitude towards religious minorities. That court has recognized that minority silence in the face of government acknowledgements of majority
religious belief may stem from reasons other than disinterest. 226 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court recently has emphasized the importance of America's "religious heritage" 227 and signaled its approval of
"tolerable acknowledgements" 228 of Christian religious beliefs.
Nevertheless, the Fox decision has limitations. It forbids government sponsorship of religious symbols only when comparable recognition
of other religions is not possible. A narrow reading of Fox might allow
§ 1607, prohibiting the inclusion of sectarian books in public schools, and § 1672, prohibiting
the distribution or use of sectarian publications in public schools. CAL. POL. CODE §§ 1607,
1672 (repealed 1943); see Evans, 193 Cal. at 55-61, 222 P. at 801-08. Justice Newman, commenting on the Evans decision in Fox, noted that while a librarian can always add new books to
the library and give comparable recognition to all who demand it, comparable recognition for
other religions on city hall, by comparison, is impracticable. 22 Cal. 3d at 797, 587 P.2d. at
655-66, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 869-70.
220. Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at 797, 587 P.2d at 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
221. See supra notes 212-14 & accompanying text.
222. See Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at 797, 587 P.2d at 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
223. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1361 (1984) (plurality opinion).
224. See supra note 217 & accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 94-97 & accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 215-16 & accompanying text.
227. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360; see supra notes 116-19 & accompanying text.
228. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983); see supra notes 116-19 & accompanying text.
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the government to employ religious symbols in forums where minority
religionists conceivably could receive comparable recognition. 2 29 Thus,
government erection of a latin cross in a public park might be permissible
under the theory that other religionists could demand government erection of their chosen religious symbols in the same park.
The most recent leading case, however, takes a more restrictive view
of California's free exercise clause. In Feminist Women's Health Center v.
Philibosian,230 the California Court of Appeal analyzed the constitutionality of government participation in a memorial service for aborted fetuses
under the free exercise clause. 23 1 The court made no mention of the avail-

ability of comparable recognition for other religious points of view. 232 Instead, the court recognized that" 'the religious freedom of every person is

threatened whenever government associates its power with one particular
religious tradition.' "233 On this basis, the court concluded that the government's proposed participation would prefer one religion over another
234
in violation of California's free exercise clause.
229. One commentator criticized the Fox court's narrow reasoning:
The majority's implication that the cross could be displayed if recognition of other
religious symbols was practicable does not preserve the separation of church and state
guaranteed by the California Constitution. It would not be difficult to imagine a situation in which the government could display the symbols of all religions.
Note, Fox v. City of Los Angeles: Preference of Religion and the Use of Independent State
Consitutional Grounds, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 666, 671 (1980) (footnotes omitted). Justice Clark,
in his dissent in Fox, similarly complained that the line "between permissible and impermissible
display remains as obscure as the city's now darkened cross." 22 Cal. 3d at 824, 587 P.2d at
683, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Clark, J., dissenting).
230. 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1752 (1985).
Philibosian also involved a challenge under California's establishment clause. For further discussion of the court's resolution under that constitutional provision, see supra text accompanying notes 147-85.
231. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1092, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 926-27.
232. The opinion acknowledges the District Attorney's argument that any other denomination was free to act with respect to the proposed burial. The court, however, does not specifically respond to this argument. Id. at 1087, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
233. Id. at 1092, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 927 (quoting Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at 805, 587 P.2d at 671, 150
Cal. Rptr. at 875 (Bird, C.J., concurring)). Even this reasoning, however, might permit some
government involvement with religious displays. This point is best illustrated in Baer v.
Kolmorgen, 14 Misc. 2d 1015, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958), decided under article I,
§ 3 of the New York Constitution. Article I, § 4 of the California Constitution was copied
verbatim from this provision at California's First Constitutional Convention. See J. BROWNE,
supra note 189, at 39. The court in Baer upheld the placement of a creche by a private group
upon the grounds of a public school. 14 Misc. 2d at 1022, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 239. The school had
allowed other groups to erect displays upon request. No such request had ever been denied. Id.
at 1019, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 236. On this basis, the court could find no preference toward, or
discrimination against, any one religion over others. See id. at 1022, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 239. In
the court's view, the school board had acceded to the creche committee's request in the same
spirit of cooperation with which it had acceded to the demands of other groups within the
community. Id.
234. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1092, 203 Cal. Rptr at 926-27.

January 1986]

RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS

The analysis of California's free exercise clause in Philibosianplaces
California law directly at odds with the rationale articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Lynch. The United States Supreme Court
has praised government sponsorship of religious symbolism as accommo-

dation of religious belief that follows "'the best of our traditions'" by
respecting "'the religious nature of our people.' 235 In contrast, the
Philibosian court expressed its conviction that government association
with a particular religious tradition threatens religious freedom.
As federal guarantees have narrowed, recent interpretations of California's free exercise and establishment clauses have provided substantial
protections against state aid to religion. The strongest mandate against
state aid to religion, however, is contained in article XVI, section 5 of the

California Constitution.
Article XVI, Section 5
For more than a century, article XVI, section 5 236 has prohibited
state and municipal governments from granting "anything to or in aid of
any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose. ' 237 No passage in

the California Constitution more clearly represents California's commitment to the separation of church and state than article XVI, section 5.
California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk describes this section as
of the principle of government impartiality in
"the definitive statement
'238

the field of religion.

235. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
236. This provision of the California Constitution was originally numbered article IV, § 30,
see 3 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, supra note 195, at 1272, was renumbered on November 8,
1966, as article XIII, § 24, see STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, PROPOSITION 1-A, app. at 8 (1966), and became article XVI, § 5 on November 5, 1974. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 187, at 79, 84.
237. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. This section states in full:
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and county, township, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or pay from
any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church,
creed, or sectarian purpose, or help to support or sustain any school, college, university, or hospital, or other institution controlled by any religious creed, church, or
sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal property or real estate ever be made by the state, or any city, city and county, town, or
other municipal corporation for any religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose
whatever; provided, that nothing in this section shall prevent the Legislature granting
aid pursuant to Section 3 of Article XVI.
Id. Article XVI, § 3 provides: "No money shall ever be appropriated.., for the purpose or
benefit of any corporation, association, asylum ... not under the exclusive management and
control of the State as a state institution .... Id. art. XVI, § 3. Notwithstanding this provision, article XVI, § 3 provides for government aid to orphans, and to certain needy persons
who are blind, aged, or physically handicapped, through private institutions not controlled by
the state. Id.
238. 37 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 105, 107 (1961). California Supreme Court Justice Stanley
Mosk was Attorney General at that time.
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The debates of the California Constitutional Convention of 1879
shed light on the framers' intent regarding article XVI, section 5. When
state neutrality in religious matters was slightly threatened by an amendment to provide public aid to private orphanages, acrimonious debate resulted. 239 The convention delegates were concerned that the orphanage
amendment violated the strict mandate of religious neutrality contained
in article XVI, section 5. Convention delegates expressed deep concerns
that the government not "infringe upon the principles of the American
Government, and that.., the State not.., support any church or religious creed. ' ' 2 4 0 The testimony of one of the proponents of the orphanage

exception gives an indication of the intensity of feeling within the
Convention:
[The amendment] does not extend any further than [the orphanage
exception]. That is the extent of the amendment. I am just as much
opposed as any gentleman upon this floor to any union of church and
State. But
I do not look upon this as State aid to a church. It is for the
24 1
orphans.

Eventually, concern for the plight of the orphans prevailed over concerns about religious neutrality. Article XVI, section 5 was amended to
allow state aid for private orphanages. 242 Nevertheless, the fact that a
239. See 3 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, supra note 195, at 783-88, 818-20, 1263-66, 1272-74.
The orphanage exception was passed as an amendment to article XVI, § 3 (formerly CAL.
CONST. art. IV, § 22), which prohibits the appropriation of public funds for private uses. The
opponents of the orphanage exception pointed out that both article XVI, § 3 and article XVI,
§ 5 (formerly CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 30) were designed, at least in part, to prevent "opportunity for special legislation and for special grabbing into the treasury," 3 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON,supra note 195, at 785 (remarks of Mr. Caples), and to prevent subsidies "in any form or
shape, to any private corporation, church or otherwise." Id. at 1273 (remarks of Mr.
Andrews).
240. See 3 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, supra note 195, at 819 (remarks of Mr. Howard).
Opponents of the orphanage measure stated their objections clearly. One delegate plainly
noted, "I shall oppose every proposition which proposes to mix up, in any way, the officers of
this State with religious institutions." Id. at 1265 (remarks of Mr. Filcher). The fiercest charge
of the opponents of the measure was that "[tihis means State support of sectarian institutions
and sectarian schools, and the gentlemen here know it very well." Id. at 1266 (remarks of Mr.
Reynolds); see also id. at 1265 (remarks of Mr. Vacquerel) (charging that education in sectarian
orphanages will make the orphans "know everything else but their duties as citizens"). Some
delegates were stung by the antisectarian fervor of the opponents. See, e.g., id. at 1263-64
(remarks of Mr. Reddy). More typically, proponents of the exception tried to blunt charges of
sectarianism. See, e.g., id. at 1263 (remarks of Mr. Murphy) ("I scorn the idea of raising the
cry of sectarian schools upon the floor of this House"); id. at 788 (remarks of Mr. Barbour) ("I,
sir, have no sectarian feelings.").
The framers also demonstrated their commitment to the separation of church and state by
adopting article IX, § 8, which places a ban on state aid to parochial schools. CAL. CONST. art.
IX, § 8; see supra note 133.
241. 3 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, supra note 195, at 1273 (remarks of Mr. Wilson).
242. Article XVI, § 5 states: "[N]othing in this section shall prevent the legislature granting aid pursuant to Section 3 of Article XVI." CAL CONST. art. XVI, § 5. Article XVI, § 3
permits the legislature to appropriate funds for private orphanages. Id. art. XVI, § 3.
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constitutional amendment was required before the legislature could provide funding for private orphanages demonstrates the framers' intention
that the ban on state aid to religion be absolute.
Although article XVI, section 5 forbids the government from granting anything in aid of any sectarian purpose, California courts initially
split on whether state aid could be justified on the basis that it provided
only incidental benefits to religion. In Frohligerv. Richardson, 43 decided
in 1921, a California appellate court invalidated a statute providing for
the restoration of historical missions owned by the Catholic church. The
state treasurer argued that the fact of ownership by the Catholic church
was incidental to the historical benefit the state would receive. Although
the court recognized the tremendous architectural and historical importance of these missions, 244 it could not overlook the plain language of
article XVI, section 5 prohibiting government aid to any sectarian purpose. The court believed that "[t]he incident is in itself sufficient to raise
the bar of [article XVI, section 5] of the constitution." 245
Subsequent cases, however, have permitted government aid to sectarian purposes if the benefit to religion was only incidental. In 1946, a California appellate court, in Bowker v. Baker,24 6 upheld a statute authorizing
the transportation to school of parochial school children on public school
buses. The court reasoned that article IX, section 1 of the California
Constitution requires the legislature to "encourage by all suitable means
the promotion of intellectual ...improvement." 247 In light of this overriding constitutional objective, any benefit the statute conferred upon religion was "incidental or immaterial. 2 48 In Gordon v. Board of
Education,2 4 9 decided one year later, voluntary release programs for public school children seeking religious instruction also were held only to
benefit religion incidentally.
Recent Developments
In 1976, the California Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
whether article XVI, section 5 permits government aid that provides only
incidental benefits to religion. In California Educational Facilities Au243. 63 Cal. App. 209, 218 P. 497 (1923).
244. Id. at 215-17, 218 P. at 499-500.
245. Id. at 217, 218 P. at 500. The court found that the statute also violated article IV, § 22
(currently CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 3) by appropriating public money to an institution not
under the exclusive control of the state. Frohliger,63 Cal. App. at 214, 218 P. at 499.
246. 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946).
247. Id. at 658-59, 167 P.2d at 258. Article XI, § 1 provides, "A general diffusion of
knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement." CAL. CONsT. art. IX, §1.
248. Bowker, 73 Cal. App. 2d at 663, 167 P.2d at 261.
249. 78 Cal. App. 2d 464, 178 P.2d 488 (1947).
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thority v. Priest,250 a unanimous court upheld a statute authorizing the
issuance of tax-free bonds by private universities against a challenge that
this statute violated the proscriptions in article XVI, section 5 against
public aid to religion. 251 The net result of the statute was to deprive the
state of revenue for the benefit of religious universities.
Although the court recognized that the framers intended "to guarantee that the power, authority, and financial resources of the government
shall never be devoted to the advancement or support" of sectarian purposes,2 52 it interpreted section 5 as a prohibition against only official involvement that had the direct, immediate, and substantial effect of
advancing religion. Thus, the court concluded that government activities
that only indirectly, remotely, and incidentally aid religion do not violate
article XVI, section 5.253 The court reasoned that the bond authorization
at issue in Priest primarily encouraged intellectual achievement,2 54 and
that any benefits the bond issues might bestow upon religion were incidental to this primary purpose.2 55 As a result, the court held that the
benefits were not violative of article XVI, section 5.256
The analysis in Priest, however, seems at odds with both the absolutist language of article XVI, section 5 and with the framers' intent in
250. 12 Cal. 3d 593, 526 P.2d 513, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974).
251. Id. at 604-06, 526 P.2d at 520-22, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 368-70. At the time of the decision, article XVI, § 5 was titled article XII, § 24. See supra note 236.
252. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d at 604, 526 P.2d at 520-21, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69 (citing Gordon
v. Board of Educ. 78 Cal. App. 2d 464, 472-73, 178 P.2d 488, 493 (1947)).
253. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d at 605, 526 P.2d at 521, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 367. The court borrowed
language from the United States Supreme Court, which had created the incidental benefit doctrine one year before in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 734 (1973), discussed
supra note 38. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d at 605 n.12, 526 P.2d at 521 n.12, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 369 n.12.
254. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d at 605-06, 526 P.2d at 521-22, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 369-70.
255. See id.
256. "In sum, although in certain subtle respects the Act appears to approach state involvement with religion ... we cannot say that in the abstract it crosses the forbidden line." Id. at
606, 526 P.2d at 522, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (citation omitted). The court's reasoning in Priest
seems to parallel contemporaneous developments in federal case law. The facts of Priest closely
resemble those of Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (state bond authorization for the construction of secular projects on private campuses), as did the outcome.
The court's reliance on federal precedent is particularly interesting because developments
in California law governing religious freedom generally have tended to precede federal decisions
on similar topics, not the other way around. Compare Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal. 2d
85, 89, 82 P.2d 391, 392-93 (1938) (applying the federal guarantees of free exercise of religion to
California through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment) with Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the free exercise clause to the states through the
fourteenth amendment); compare Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946)
(allowing transportation of parochial children on public school buses) with Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (allowing reimbursement for transportation of parochial school children); compare Gordon v. Board of Educ., 78 Cal. App. 2d 464, 178 P.2d 488 (1947) (sustaining a voluntary time release program for public students attending religious programs) with
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (sustaining a similar program).
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enacting that section. While the court's justification for the bond issues
mirrored those arguments advanced by the proponents of the orphanage
exception to article XVI, section 5,257 the framers indicated that such aid
to religion required a specific constitutional exemption.
The Priestcourt also failed to define which types of government aid
only incidentally benefit religion. The use of similarly vague terms has
caused great uncertainties in federal establishment clause analysis. As
with California's free exercise clause doctrine, federal establishment
clause doctrine permits only indirect government aid to religion.2 58 The
types of aid that are deemed indirect, however, have varied from case to
case. For example, the United States Supreme Court has upheld loans of
textbooks to parochial schools, 2 59 while invalidating loans of maps to parochial school; 260 it has upheld state tax deductions for the parents of
parochial schoolchildren, 2 61 while invalidating tax credits for the parents
of parochial schoolchildren. 2 62 In addition, the Supreme Court's loose
263
definition of indirect aid allowed the religious display at issue in Lynch.
Attempting to resolve these ambiguities in Priest, the California
Supreme Court recently limited the scope of permissible aid under article
XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution.2 64 In California Teachers'
Association v. Riles,265 decided in 1981, the California Supreme Court
overturned a statute authorizing public school districts to loan secular
textbooks to parochial school students. The court held that the plan violated article XVI, section 5 by providing public aid to a religious institution. 266 The court refused to follow the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Board of Education v. Allen, 267 which upheld a statute authorizing similar textbook loans. 268 The Supreme Court in Allen reasoned
that the government could constitutionally aid parochial schools in per257. See supra text accompanying note 241.

258. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364-65 (1975).
259. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968) (secular textbooks lent directly
to the parochial students).
260. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) (instructional materials lent directly
to parochial schools).
261. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396-402 (1983) (deduction for tuition, textbooks, and
transportation available to all parents for expenses of public or private school incurred by
choice of parents, not of state).
262. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789-94 (1973) (state's resulting
loss of revenue constitutes an effective charge upon the state for the purpose of religious
education).
263. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364 (1984) (plurality opinion); see supra notes
98-104 & accompanying text.
264. See California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 807-13, 632 P.2d 953, 960-64,
176 Cal. Rptr. 300, 307-11 (1981).
265. 29 Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1981).
266. Id. at 813, 632 P.2d at 964, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
267. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
268. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d at 812, 632 P.2d at 963, 176 Cal. Rptr at 310.
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forming the mission of secular education. 269
Writing for the majority in Riles, Justice Mosk reviewed many federal decisions on public aid to parochial schools, but was unable to harmonize their holdings. 270 In his view, the United States Supreme Court
had erred by focusing primarily on the secular benefit that the challenged
government activity provided to the children. 27' Justice Mosk stated that
the nature of the aid to religion was an equally important factor. 272 As a
result, the Riles decision established a two-part test for analyzing the validity of government aid under article XVI, section 5. A California court
must first examine whether the aid to religion is direct or indirect, and
second, consider the nature of the aid.2 73 Regardless of whether the aid is
direct or indirect, government aid that possesses doctrinal content or advances an essential objective of a sectarian institution confers an impermissible benefit upon religion in violation of article XVI, section 5.274 To
illustrate this point, the court distinguished textbook loans, which impermissibly advance parochial school education, from police and fire protection, " 'which are indisputably marked off from the religious function.' ",275 While the court also found that the textbook loan directly
aided sectarian schools, the court downplayed the importance of this inquiry and primarily focused on the nature of the aid in finding the text27 6
book loan impermissible.
Although Riles was decided in a parochial school context, the ration269. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 245.
270. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d at 807-08, 632 P.2d at 960-61, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08.
271. Id. at 807-09, 632 P.2d at 960-62, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 307-09. Other state courts have
similarly used independent state grounds to invalidate state aid to parochial schools when they
perceived that federal protections against government aid to religion were too weak. See, e.g.,
Epeldi v. Engelking, 94 Idaho 390, 488 P.2d 860 (1971) (prohibiting transportation of parochial
students aboard public school buses), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). The majority in Epeldi
observed that "it is our conclusion that the framers of our constitution intended to more positively enunciate the separation between church and state than did the framers of the United
States Constitution." Id. at 395, 488 P.2d at 865; see also Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192
Neb. 358, 220 N.W.2d 550 (1974) (prohibiting textbook loans to parochial school students).
The Gaffney court noted, "There is no ambiguity in our constitutional provision [prohibiting
aid to sectarian schools]. The impact of the language and its purpose can be understood by any
literate person. The standards are not secular purpose, primary aid, or political divisiveness
and state-church entanglement." Id. at 362, 220 N.W.2d at 553 (citation omitted).
272. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d at 809, 632 P.2d at 962, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
273. Id.
274. The court emphasized that "not all expenditures directly for the benefit of sectarian
schools are prohibited . . . and not all expenditures for the immediate benefit of children are
valid." Id. at 811, 632 P.2d at 963, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
275. See id. at 811-12, 632 P.2d at 963, 176 Cal. Rptr at 310 (quoting Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)). As one writer observed, "The key is to determine whether a
particular form of aid has doctrinal content." Note, California Teachers Association v. Riles:
Textbook Loans to Sectarian Schools, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 974 (1982).
276. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d at 812, 632 P.2d at 963, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 310 (quoting Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
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ale of Riles seems equally applicable to public sponsorship of religious
displays. Litigants have argued, with varying degrees of success, that the
erection of religious displays serves secular purposes and only incidentally
benefits religion. 277 All religious displays however, possess doctrinal content. The religious nature of a creche, a cross, or the Ten Commandments cannot be gainsaid. It is the doctrinal importance of these displays
that make them religious. As the California Supreme Court has noted:
"Easter crosses differ from Easter bunnies,
just as Christmas crosses differ
' 278
from Christmas trees and Santa Claus.
Because religious displays possess a doctrinal character, government
participation in their erection or maintenance is inconsistent with the rationale of Riles and thereby violates article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution. By recognizing the importance of the character of
government aid to religion, the Riles decision provides a substantial, additional barrier to government sponsorship of religious displays.
Conclusion
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly279 represents a
radical departure from traditional establishment clause analysis. The decision in that case has drawn severe criticism from prominent constitutionalists. 280 Professor Tribe has compared the Lynch decision to Plessy
v. Ferguson.21l The Court has been accused of paying only "lip service"
282
to traditional establishment clause analysis.
At one time, the United States Supreme Court was concerned with
government sponsorship of religion and its tendency to constrain freedom
of worship. 2 83 Now the Supreme Court focuses on America's religious
heritage and discounts the symbolic benefit government sponsorship of
277. Compare Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (posting of the Ten Commandments presents the "fundamental legal code of Western Civilization") and ACLU of Georgia v.
Rathbun Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1109 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (cross erected to
promote tourism) with Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1363-65 (1984) (plurality opinion)
(creche erected to celebrate Christmas).
278. Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 798, 587 P.2d 663, 668, 150 Cal. Rptr.
867, 870 (1978).
279. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 94-107 & accompanying
text.
280. See supra notes 5-6 & accompanying text.
281. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific

Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 162 (1984) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-52 (1896)
(affirming the constitutional validity of the "separate but equal" doctrine)). In Professor
Tribe's opinion, the Lynch decision expressed the Court's feeling that special government recognition of Christianity does not create an inferior status for nonadherents. Rather, if nonadherents feel their treatment is unequal, it is only because of the construction they place on the
government's acts. Tribe, supra, at 161-62.
282. Fausto v. Diamond, 589 F. Supp. 451, 465 n.15 (D.R.I. 1984).
283. See supra notes 66-68, 87 & accompanying text.
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sacred religious symbols bestows on Christians. 28 4
In contrast to modem federal establishment clause doctrine, the California Supreme Court requires a stricter separation of church and state
and protects freedom of worship for both majority and minority religionists. California courts repeatedly have relied upon the California Constitution to provide guarantees against state aid to religion in the face of
federal ambiguity. Interpreting California's establishment clause, California's courts have required the state to avoid the appearance of religious
partiality, have applied strict scrutiny to government activities that prefer
one religion over others, and have affirmed the importance of political
28 5
divisiveness as a factor in judging the validity of government actions.
Interpreting the California free exercise clause, the California Supreme
Court has prohibited special government recognition of one religion when
comparable recognition of all religions is not possible. 28 6 Interpreting the
general prohibition on state aid to religion contained in article XVI, section 5,287 the California Supreme Court has prohibited the government
28 8
from granting to religion aid that possesses doctrinal content.
California law provides an array of protections absent under current
federal interpretations of the federal Constitution. If other state courts
interpret their constitutional provisions relating to freedom of religion as
broadly as the California Supreme Court has interpreted its constitutional
provisions, state constitutions will provide necessary protections at a time
when the federal limits on government aid to religion are increasingly
2
uncertain . 89
Harry Simon *

284. See supra notes 116-19 & accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 165, 170 & accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 219-21 & accompanying text. In contrast, the Lynch decision allows

special government recognition of one religion without regard to the interests of other religions.
Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1373-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
287. CAL. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5.
288. See supra notes 264-76 & accompanying text. In contrast, the Lynch decision allowed

Pawtucket to erect and maintain a display illustrating a central tenet of the Christian religion.
Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1377 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 96.
289. For a discussion of relevant state constitutional provisions that parallel California's
constitutional provisions, see supra notes 10-13 & accompanying text.
*
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